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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is on the march. Mandatory arbitration
agreements have become a common feature in employment, as a
Vox article noted: “Millions of American workers have given up
their right to go to court just to earn a paycheck. They can’t sue
their employer for sexual harassment, or for racial
discrimination, or for stealing their wages, or for nearly
anything else.”1
As the article pointed out, this even has the potential to
thwart the #MeToo movement: “Women are coming forward,
often for the first time, with stories of widespread sexual
harassment at work, only to discover that they’ve been shut out
of the court system because they signed an arbitration
agreement.”2
This trend is concerning. As Stephen Stachowski, has
written:
One of the key, if not predominant, purposes of arbitration is to
serve as an effective and efficient form of alternative dispute
resolution. In the world of capitalism such a purpose may even be
considered a virtue. However, this purpose may be especially
disheartening because in its pursuit of efficiency arbitration leaves
behind another virtue: justice.3

Surely we might agree that there are employment
1. Alexia Fernández Campbel & Alvin Chang, There’s a Good Chance You’ve Waived
(Sep.
7,
2018),
the
Right
to
Sue
Your
Boss,
VOX
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/1/16992362/sexual-harassment-mandatory-arbitration
2. Id. Among those affected was former Fox News anchor Gretchen Carlson:
She ended up suing Roger Ailes for sexual
harassment, and they settled for an
undisclosed amount. But Carlson could not
sue Fox News for the company’s role in
allowing the sexual harassment to persist,
and neither could dozens of other women who
accused the media company of tolerating
sexual harassment, had they decided they
wanted to sue.
Id.
3. Stephen Stachowski, Arbitration’s Use of Experts Hinders Justice, ARB. L. REV.
(Dec.
26,
2017)
(emphasis
added),
BLOG
https://sites.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview/2017/12/26/arbitrations-use-of-expertshinders-justice/.
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situations in which complainants should have access to the
courtroom. While sexual harassment is a sympathetic reason,
and has precipitated congressional legislation described later in
this piece, what of wage theft? Wage theft is surely as injurious,
and can often disproportionately affect women – particularly in
the service economy.4 And what of racial discrimination –
especially at a time when immigrants are being targeted for
deportation and may be afraid to interact with those enforcing
workplace laws?5
As one scholar says of arbitration generally:
Inasmuch as arbitration doctrine stifles the judiciary’s
essential role in declaring ‘what the law is,’ so too does it diminish
the deliberative character of democratic governance that the
Petition Clause facilitates. It privatizes the once-public dialogue
between court and litigant, and in turn, shuts the public out of an
entire branch of government.6

This article first examines the landscape for mandatory
employment arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act,7 as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its May 2018 decision
in Epic Systems v. Lewis.8 Has mandatory arbitration become,
as Professor Cynthia Estlund maintained even before Epic, a
“black hole into which matter collapses and no light escapes”?9
4. See, e.g, Justice for Nail Salon Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/opinion/justice-for-nail-salon-workers.html
(“Across the country, countless workers in the nail salon industry, mainly immigrant
women, toil in misery and ill health for meager pay, usually with no overtime,
abused by employers who show little or no consideration for their safety and wellbeing.”) Id.
5. See, e.g., Laura D. Francis, Fear of Immigration Raids May Harm Workplace
Rights, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fear-immigration-raidsn57982084586/. (“With the highest rates of wage and hour violations among
undocumented immigrants—particularly women—employer threats of calls to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement are ‘very strong,’ Haeyoung Yoon, director of
strategic partnerships at the National Employment Law Project, said[.]”) Id.
6. See Matthew J. Stanford, Diminution Doctrine: Arbitration’s First Amendment
Problem, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 73, 93-94 (2018) (emphasis added).
7. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1990).
8. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Nina Tottenberg,
Supreme Court Decision Delivers Blow To Workers’ Rights, NPR (May 21, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/05/21/605012795/supreme-court-decision-delivers-blow-toworkers-rights (At stake, though the facts were lacking in the opinion, “[t]he ruling
came in three cases — potentially involving tens of thousands of nonunion employees
— brought against Ernst & Young LLP, Epic Systems Corp. and Murphy Oil USA
Inc.”)
9. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
682 (2018).
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The article then examines some state, and federal,
legislative efforts to shed some light on at least the employment
sexual harassment claims that might otherwise disappear into
the “black hole” that Professor Estlund evocatively describes.10
In its third part, the article takes notice of two Eleventh
Circuit decisions that suggest even arbitration is not without its
risks for businesses.11
The article concludes with the author recommending a
congressional approach, as well as a clever approach taken by
one state, replicable in others, that would appear to not be
preempted under the FAA.12
II. EPIC SYSTEMS V. LEWIS
Under the Obama Administration, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) was curtailing the use of arbitration
agreements. As the NLRB has recounted: “The Board first held
that the maintenance of individual arbitration agreements
containing class-action waivers violated the Act in 2012. During
the six years that this rule was in place, Board decisions
invalidated arbitration agreements and policies used by many
employers.”13
As described by the NLRB in 2012:
The National Labor Relations Board has ruled that it is a
violation of federal labor law to require employees to sign
arbitration agreements that prevent them from joining together to
pursue employment-related legal claims in any forum, whether in
arbitration or in court.

The decision examined one such agreement used by
nationwide homebuilder D.R. Horton, under which employees
waived their right to a judicial forum and agreed to bring all
claims to an arbitrator on an individual basis. The agreement
prohibited the arbitrator from consolidating claims, fashioning a
class or collective action, or awarding relief to a group or class of
employees.
10. See generally, id.
11. See, infra Part IV.
12. See, infra Part IV.
13. Press Release, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, Supreme Court Issues Decision in NLRB
v. Murphy Oil USA (May 21, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/newsstory/supreme-court-issues-decision-nlrb-v-murphy-oil-usa.
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The Board found that the agreement unlawfully barred
employees from engaging in “concerted activity” protected by the
National Labor Relations Act. The Board emphasized that the
ruling does not require class arbitration as long as the
agreement leaves open a judicial forum for group claims.14
Yet the election of President Trump offered a chance to
sweep away this restriction. And in Epic the U.S. Supreme
Court’s newest justice, Neil Gorsuch, again proved his
conservative bona fides by authoring an opinion, on a 5-4 split,
that had business groups cheering, effectively ruling that the
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) trumps the rights the NLRB
conferred upon workers through the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act.15
In Epic, Gorsuch framed the questions at the outset of his
opinion: “Should employees and employers be allowed to agree
that any disputes between them will be resolved through one-onone arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to
bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what
they agreed with their employers?”16
Allowing that “[a]s a matter of policy these questions are
surely debatable,” Gorsuch read the Federal Arbitration Act as
“a congressional command requiring us to enforce, not override,
the terms of the arbitration agreements before us.”17 He
accorded no deference to the NLRB, noting “the Executive has
disavowed the Board’s (most recent) position[.]”18
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote, “[t]he
inevitable result of today’s decision will be the underenforcement
of federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being
of vulnerable workers.”19 She maintained that “[i]f employers
can stave off collective employment litigation aimed at obtaining
redress for wage and hours infractions, the enforcement gap is
almost certain to widen.”20 And she rejected the majority’s

14. Press Release, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, Board Finds that Certain Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements Violate Federal Labor Law (Jan. 6, 2012),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-finds-certain-mandatoryarbitration-agreements-violate-federal-labor.
15. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018) (holding that “the
Board hasn’t just sought to interpret its statute, the NLRB, in isolation; it has
sought to interpret this statute in a way that limits the work of a second statute, the
Arbitration Act. . . . it does not administer”).
16. Id. at 1619.
17. Id. at 1623.
18. Id. at 1621.
19. Id. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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argument that it was simply applying statute: “[T]he edict that
employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only oneby-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-itor-leave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called ‘yellow
dog,’ and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those
unbargained-for agreements.”21
Ginsburg noted that the FAA has become supersized
through the Court’s interpretation: “In recent decades, this
Court has veered away from Congress’ intent simply to afford
merchants a speedy and economical means of resolving
commercial disputes.”22
An article in Current Affairs described the case colorfully:
In April 2014, a Wisconsin healthcare company called Epic
Systems sent an email to employees. The message contained 1) a
new company policy—that all of their claims would now be subject
to individual arbitration and 2) a sort of perverse contractual choose
your own adventure” game informing employees that they could
either “confirm their consent” or ask that someone talk to them
about the agreement. Some choice. Not wanting to be fired, the
employees consented. What else were they going to do? 23

Take-it-or-leave-it arbitration agreements in employment
certainly beg the question of whether a true “meeting of the
minds” has occurred, as contract law would normally require.24
As the Washington Post reported:
Hours after the decision, one law firm, Ogletree Deakins,
announced an “automated tool that quickly prepares custom
arbitration agreements with class action waivers based on

employers’ requirements and preferences.”25
21. Id. at 1648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). More than one legal scholar has criticized
this trend. See Stanford, supra note 6, at 88 (“Despite an absence of preemptive text
or legislative history, the Court has interpreted the FAA to relieve states of their
power to require a judicial forum for certain disputes.”)
23. Sparky Abraham & Oren Nimni, Everyone Needs The Right To Sue Their
AFFAIRS
(May
23,
2018),
Employer,
CURRENT
https://www.currentaffairs.org/author/sparkyoren.
24. See, e.g., Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 29 (“There must be mutual assent or a meeting
of the minds at the same time, on all the essential elements or terms to form a
binding contract.”) (Footnotes omitted).
25. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court rules that companies can require workers to accept
individual
arbitration,
WASH.
POST
(May
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-that-
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Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning came under attack from
Garrett Epps, a University of Baltimore law professor, in The
Atlantic:
False dichotomy, meretricious piety, and pay-no-attention-tothat-man-behind-the-curtain misdirection are vital arrows in the
quiver of any lawyer or judge, no matter of what persuasion. These
tricks were on particularly egregious display in Epic Systems Corp.
v. Lewis, a 5-4 decision announced Monday in which the Supreme
Court’s conservative majority continued its drive to narrow
protection for employee rights. 26

He stated: “Employees’ objection to a ‘no group arbitration’
clause is that individual arbitration may concern amounts too
small to make pursuing them worthwhile. Thus, these clauses
make it easier for employers to maintain unfair or even unlawful
employment structures and salary systems.”27 As David
Leonhardt wrote, “[e]ffectively, this means workers often can’t
sue at all, because individual employees usually don’t have the
money to hire lawyers and file a claim.”28
The libertarian Cato Institute saw it another way, with
Walter Olson writing, “Since contracts of this sort typify most of
the modern economy, the implication, usually not spelled out, is
that modern consumer and workplace relationships have no
moral basis in autonomy and should be second-guessed and have
their terms freely substituted by one or another entity of the
State.”29
In response to the ruling, a Restaurant News article
advised: “Restaurant operators should make mandatory
arbitration agreements with collective-action waivers a standard
part of their hiring practices, according to attorneys specializing
in employment cases.”30 It cited “the $5.25 million lawsuit
companies-can-force-workers-into-individual-arbitration/2018/05/21/09a3a968-5cfa11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html?utm_term=.853967238140.
26. Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, ATLANTIC (May
22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-courtdecision-on-employment/560963/.
27. Id.
28. David Leonhardt, The Supreme Court v. Your Paycheck, N.Y. TIMES (May 22,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/opinion/supreme-court-arbitration.html.
29. Walter Olson, Epic Systems v. Lewis: It’s OK To Calm Down About Arbitration,
CATO INST. (May 22, 2018), https://www.cato.org/blog/apocalypse-not-arbitrationsurvives-epic-systems-v-lewis.
30. Mark Hamstra, Should You Require Employees to Sign an Arbitration
Agreement?,
NATION’S
RESTAURANT
NEWS
(June
5,
2018),
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settled in 2012 by celebrity chef Mario Batali and his business
partners.”31
III. FEDERAL
OVERREACH

AND

STATE

RESPONSES

TO

ARBITRAL

It seems questionable that in this hyper-partisan era
Congress can address the most objectionable implications of
Epic, although “[i]n the wake of the oral argument in Epic, Sen.
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut introduced the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2018 to prohibit enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employment as well as in civil rights,
consumer, and antitrust disputes.”32 Bipartisan legislation has
https://www.nrn.com/workforce/should-you-require-employees-sign-arbitrationagreement.
31. Id. Is it really objectionable that workers could collectively join together and
recover for the alleged theft of their tips? To quote a 2012 article:
The lawsuit against Mr. Batali, filed in 2010,
said that he and a partner, Joseph Bastianich,
and their restaurants had a policy of
deducting an amount equivalent to 4 to 5
percent of total wine sales at the end of each
night from the tip pool and keeping the
money.
Benjamin Weiser, Mario Batali Agrees to $5.25 Million Settlement Over Employee
Tips,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
7,
2012),
https://dinersjournal.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/mario-batali-agrees-to-5-25million-settlement-over-employee-tips/. This was hardly a frivolous case. And Batali
has other challenges now that arbitration may not preempt. See, e.g., Sandra
Gonzalez, Mario Batali sued by woman who claims he groped her, CNN (Aug. 24,
2018)
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/24/entertainment/mario-batali-sexual-assaultlawsuit/index.html. (“The suit comes several months after Batali first faced
allegations of sexual misconduct.”).
32. Craig Becker, Supreme Court Won’t Have the Last Word on Worker Rights, CNN
(June 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/opinions/supreme-court-deals-blowto-unions-becker/index.html. In the U.S. House, Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D., Wash.)
has introduced a similar bill, and stated:
I actually believe that forced arbitration of all
kinds is something that needs to be looked at
and potentially removed—but in this bill we
specifically say that sexual harassment
should not be included in any forced
arbitration agreement, and that employees
who come to an employer should always be
able to have the choice of bringing their
complaint around discrimination, assault, or
harassment either to an arbitrator, or to take
action against the employer in court.
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also been introduced to address the especially-outrageous fact
that sexual harassment claims can be forced into arbitration.33 A
sponsor, New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, a Democrat like
Blumenthal, has “pointed out that employers paying out
settlements are not ‘solving the problem’ and that companies
with predators in place won’t ‘attract the best and the brightest,’
adding, that it ‘stifles growth.’”34 Her Republican co-sponsor,
South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham, joined her at a press
event in unveiling the bill, and issued a press release that
stated:
Today, an estimated 60 million Americans are subject to forced
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts. The bipartisan
legislation would void forced arbitration agreements that require
arbitration of sexual harassment and discrimination claims and
allow survivors of sexual harassment or discrimination to seek
justice, discuss their cases publicly, and eliminate institutional
protection for harassers.35

Leah Fessler, You’ve probably signed away your sexual harassment civil rights at
work, QZ.COM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://qz.com/work/1244779/congresswoman-pramilajayapal-on-how-mandatory-arbitration-hurts-sexual-harassment-victims/.
33. Fessler, supra note 32.
34. Adina Genn, Gillibrand: End Forced Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases,
LONG ISLAND BUS. NEWS (Jan. 26, 2018), https://libn.com/2018/01/26/gillibrand-endforced-arbitration-in-sexual-harassment-discrimination-cases/. Every single attorney
general in the United States and its territories has signed a letter to Congress urging
them to exclude sexual harassment claims from arbitration:
While there may be benefits to arbitration
provisions in other contexts, they do not
extend to sexual harassment claims. Victims
of such serious misconduct should not be
constrained to pursue relief from decision
makers who are not trained as judges, are not
qualified to act as courts of law, and are not
positioned to ensure that such victims are
accorded both procedural and substantive due
process.
Letter from Pamela Jo Bondi, Fla. Atty. Gen., et al. to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the
House, et al. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/HFISAVWMYN/%24file/NAAG+letter+to+Congress+Sexual+Harassment+Mandatory+Arb
itration.pdf.
35. Press Release, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, Graham, Gillibrand
Announce Bipartisan Legislation To Help Prevent Sexual Harassment In The
Workplace (Dec. 6, 2017) (on file Graham Senate Office). Graham is a perhaps an
unlikely champion of encouraging women to “discuss their cases publicly” – when
Supreme Court nominee Brett Kavanaugh was accused of sexual assault, Graham
did not wait for his accuser to be able to tell her story before the Senate Judiciary
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One can hope that the #MeToo movement, culminating in
the 2018 uproar over the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh
to the U.S. Supreme Court, might at least move forward in 2019
legislation to guarantee sexual harassment victims access to
courts, though partisanship might hold even this legislation
back.36
At least, some employers in the private sector may do the
right thing, absent legislation. In November 2018, after
thousands of workers staged a walkout protesting workplace
policies, Google announced “it would end its requirement for
employee sexual-harassment claims to be handled in private
arbitration[.]”37 Facebook followed suit.38
Absent congressional action, the ability of states to do much
may be limited. In Washington, Democratic Governor Jay Inslee
issued an executive order directing that:
[t]o the extent permissible under state and federal law, when
making purchasing and other procurement decisions, all state
executive and small cabinet agencies shall seek to contract with

qualified entities and business owners that can demonstrate or
will certify that their employees are not required to sign, as a
condition of employment, mandatory individual arbitration
clauses and class or collective action waivers.39
Committee: “Graham repeatedly expressed doubt about the allegation . . . based on
the amount of time that has passed since the alleged assault and the lack of
evidence.” William Cummings, ‘I’m not going to ruin Judge Kavanaugh’s life over
this’: Sen. Graham doubts Ford’s story, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/09/23/brett-kavanaughallegation-sen-lindsey-graham-has-doubts-ford/1403189002/.
36. See, e.g., Phillip Bump, Some Conservatives Have Identified the Real Victims in
the
Kavanaugh
Fight:
Men,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
24,
2018)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/24/some-conservatives-haveidentified-real-victims-kavanaugh-fight-men/?utm_term=.42f43357acfe. (“In a recent
Pew Research Center poll, no group was less likely than Republican men to say that
discrimination against women was a barrier to top executive positions or higher
political office. About 15 percent of Republican men believed that gender
discrimination was a major reason for low representation of women in either area.”).
37. Douglas MacMillan, Google to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual-Harassment
Claims, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-to-endforced-arbitration-for-sexual-harassment-claims-1541696868.
38. See Jena McGregor, Google and Facebook ended forced arbitration for sexual
harassment claims. Why more companies could follow, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/12/google-facebook-ended-forcedarbitration-sex-harassment-claims-why-more-companies-couldfollow/?utm_term=.4457e4d36c11.
39. Wash.
Exec.
Order
18-03
(June
12,
2018).
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/exe_order/18-03%20%20Workers%20Rights%20%28tmp%29.pdf.
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States can certainly do this much.
California took things a step further in 2018, with what one
newspaper described as a “#MeToo-driven bill” to ban
mandatory arbitration in employment contracts.40 Democratic
Governor Jerry Brown had vetoed such a ban before,41 and he
vetoed the 2018 bill too.42 However well-intended, such an action
would surely violate the FAA.43 To quote a majority opinion by
Justice Kagan, the FAA “preempts any state rule discriminating
on its face against arbitration. . . . And not only that: The Act
also displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same
objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have
the defining features of arbitration agreements.”44
For that reason, a New York law enacted in 2018 is likely
void.45 It purports to ban “any clause or provision in any contract
which requires as a condition of the enforcement of the contract
or obtaining remedies under the contract that the parties submit
to mandatory arbitration to resolve any allegation or claim of an
unlawful discriminatory practice of sexual harassment.”46
The Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of
2018 enacted in Maryland seems to be self-defeating in its
preamble:
Except as prohibited by federal law, a provision in an
employment contract, policy, or agreement that waives any
substantive or procedural right or remedy to a claim that accrues in
the future of sexual harassment or retaliation for reporting or
asserting a right or remedy based on sexual harassment is null and

40. Ethan Baron, Proposed ban on mandatory arbitration moves ahead with
NEWS
(Aug.
23,
2018),
California
Senate
vote,
MERCURY
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/08/22/proposed-ban-on-mandatory-arbitrationmoves-ahead-with-state-senate-vote/.
41. Id.
42. Melanie Mason, Measures to end forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims,
extend statute of limitations vetoed by Gov. Jerry Brown, L.A. TIMES (Sept, 30, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-may-2018measures-to-end-forced-arbitration-of-1538341555-htmlstory.html.
43. Id. (“‘The direction from the Supreme Court since my earlier veto has been clear
— states must follow the Federal Arbitration Act and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Act,’ Brown wrote. He called any policy like AB 3080
‘impermissible.’”).
44. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017).
45. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7515 (McKinney 2018).
46. Id. at § 7515(a)(2).
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void as being against the public policy of the state.47

The problem, of course, is that this is prohibited by federal
law.
The greatest act of state defiance occurred in Kentucky in
September 2018, when the Kentucky Supreme Court enforced a
state law prohibiting “employers from conditioning employment
on the employee’s agreement to a contract provision mandating
arbitration in the event of a dispute between them” and
concluded that “the statute does not run afoul of the FAA under
the facts of this case.”48 The court artfully – perhaps too artfully
– determined that the statute in question was:
not an anti-arbitration clause provision—it is an antiemployment discrimination provision. KRS 336.700(2) uniformly
voids any agreement diminishing an employee’s rights against an
employer when that agreement had to be signed by the employee on
penalty of termination or as a predicate to working for that
employer. As such, we hold that the FAA does not preempt KRS
336.700(2) because it does not discriminate against arbitration
agreements but rather the conditioning of employment on an
employee’s agreement to arbitrate. 49

IV. BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR: TWO CAUTIONARY 11TH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS ON ARBITRATION
In Epic, Justice Ginsburg had noted “that individual
arbitration of employee complaints can give rise to anomalous
results.”50 However, that cuts both ways, and some evidence
suggests businesses might want to be careful about what they
have asked for. As a legal commentator, Alison Frankel, wrote,
“The Epic decision tilted the already lopsided balance of power
between employers and employees even more dramatically in
companies’ favor. What could possibly go wrong?”51

47. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-715(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
48. N. Ky. Area Dev. Dist. v. Snyder, 570 S.W. 3d 531 (Ky. 2018).
49. Id. (citing Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 336.700(2) (West 2018), amended 2019). The
Court has previously struck down an attempt by Kentucky to bypass the FAA. See
Kindred Nursing Centers, 137 S. Ct. 1421.
50. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648 (2018) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
51. Alison Frankel, From the 11th Circuit, a cautionary tale for employers imposing
arbitration on workers, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-

2019]

SIGN OR ELSE.

271

Answering her own question, Frankel looked to an August
2018 decision from the Eleventh Circuit, and stated:
Plenty, according to a ruling Wednesday from the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hernandez v. Acosta, which provides a
$100,000 warning that individual employee arbitration is not
necessarily a no-lose proposition for employers. “The idea is that
employers prefer arbitration because it promises ‘quicker, more
informal, and often cheaper resolutions for everyone involved,’” the
11th Circuit wrote, quoting Epic. “But as this case shows,
arbitration does not always live up to this promise.” 52

In that case, the employer, Acosta Tractors, complained:
“‘Arbitration is meant to be a less costly and efficient substitute
for litigation. In these cases, arbitration has instead turned into
an overly-expensive, completely inefficient method of dispute
resolution.’ Acosta said ‘[t]he arbitrators’ fees alone likely exceed
the amount in controversy, exclusive of attorneys’ fees.’”53
In effect, the Eleventh Circuit gave Acosta a Pyrrhic victory.
It noted, “[t]he District Court determined that Acosta’s default in
the arbitration proceedings also warranted the entry of a default
judgment against it in federal court. This was error.”54 For that
reason, the case was remanded.55 But, the court noted:
On remand, the District Court may well find that Acosta acted
in bad faith in choosing not to pay its arbitration fees. After all,
Acosta acknowledges it quit paying after the arbitrator failed to
consolidate Mr. Hernandez’s case with the other cases brought by
other Acosta employees, and because it thought the arbitrator had
allowed too much discovery. Acosta also noted that arbitration was
set to cost more than Mr. Hernandez’s claim was worth. A
calculated choice to abandon arbitration after getting adverse
rulings from the arbitrator certainly looks like forum shopping. 56

In other words, Acosta was bound to the benefit of its
bargain – through its own arbitration language it had opened

otc-epic/from-the-11th-circuit-a-cautionary-tale-for-employers-imposing-arbitrationon-workers-idUSKBN1KU2GF.
52. Id.
53. Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors, Inc., 898 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2018).
54. Id. at 1305.
55. Id. at 1306.
56. Id.
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the door to these consequences. Arbitration could be a doubleedged sword – upon unsheathing it, one must live or die by it.
As Frankel noted:
After Epic, smart employment lawyers on both sides of the bar
have been saying quietly that case-by-case wage-and-hour
arbitration could end up being a more expensive proposition for
corporate defendants than class actions resolving allegations in one
swoop – assuming, of course, that employees actually bring
arbitration claims and find lawyers to prosecute their cases.57

Frankel may prove to be too sanguine. But arbitration is not
without its risks for employers. As one employment law
attorney, Ron Chapman, was quoted stating:
“Arbitrators will frequently try to ‘split the baby’ and please all
sides,” he said. “The upside is that all claims have to be arbitrated
individually, so you avoid the big class actions and the exposure
that comes with them, but the downside is that you run the risk of
compromised rewards from the arbitrator.”58

In Risk Management, another attorney writes:
As for its disadvantages, some experts point out that
arbitration is often just as expensive and time-consuming as
litigation. These critics cite the increasing complexity of arbitration
disputes and the fact that counsel sometimes treats arbitration no
differently than it does litigation.

Beyond this, others see the lack of judicial review or
appellate mechanisms as a disadvantage since it leaves an
aggrieved party with little recourse in the event of a decision
with which they disagree.59
This lesson – that arbitration does not always lead to
business happiness – was built upon by another Eleventh
Circuit ruling, in September 2018. In JPAY, Inc. v. Kobel,60
“Cynthia Kobel and Shalanda Houston sought to compel
57. Frankel, supra note 51.
58. Hamstra, supra note 30.
59. Peter A. Halprin, Determining the Arbitration Obligation, RISK MGMT. (Apr. 3,
2017), http://www.rmmagazine.com/2017/04/03/determining-the-arbitrationobligation/.
60. JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2018).
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arbitration on a class basis with JPay, Inc., a Miami-based
company that provides fee-for-service amenities in prisons in
more than thirty states.”61 JPay successfully sought a summary
judgment compelling Kobel and Houston “to arbitrate only their
own claims.”62 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
making clear the stakes:
In class arbitration, like in a class action, representative
plaintiffs make their case before the adjudicator on behalf of a host
of similarly situated plaintiffs who will have the opportunity to
collect damages if the class wins. Procedures like notice
requirements and opt-out opportunities protect the interests of
these absent class members, but, nonetheless, allowing a class
proceeding means determining the rights of many parties who are
not actively involved, not represented by their own counsel, and, in
all likelihood, not paying attention. Class availability opens a
“gateway” to the arbitration proceedings, through which thousands
of these absent class members might pass if a class is available. 63

In contrast, where “a class is not available, the
representative plaintiffs, here, Kobel and Houston, will argue
only for themselves.”64 As the court noted:
Many, if not most, putative class proceedings, are for relatively
small-dollar claims. If claimants must act on an individual basis,
the cost of arbitrating any single claim would certainly outweigh
their expected recovery. No single bilateral arbitration would be
rational. Only by joining together as a class do they make
arbitration efficient.65

The court found:
a clear and unmistakable intent to delegate questions of
arbitrability to the arbitrator throughout the arbitration provision
in JPay’s Terms of Service. First, it references AAA rules three
times . . . Second, and quite independently, the parties expressly
agreed that “[t]he ability to arbitrate the dispute, claim or
controversy shall likewise be determined in the arbitration.”
61. Id. at 926.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 931-932.
64. Id. at 932.
65. Id.
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Finally, the agreement is written in unmistakably broad terms, as
the parties agreed “to arbitrate any and all such disputes, claims
and controversies.”66

Sitting by designation, retired Judge James Graham, a
district court judge from the Southern District of Ohio,
disagreed: “I believe that a general delegation to arbitrate issues
of arbitrability is not enough and that without a specific
reference to class arbitration the court should presume that the
parties did not intend to delegate to an arbitrator an issue of
such great consequence.”67
As Vox had reported:
If you ask employers why they require workers to use
arbitration, they often say it’s a faster and less expensive process
than the courts. They’re not wrong. But legal research, surveys, and
employment attorneys point to the largest incentive of all: keeping
employment claims from reaching a jury. Juries are considered
more sympathetic to workers’ claims, and more willing to award
millions of dollars in damages to workers in these cases. The threat
of a high jury award also gives workers leverage in negotiating
larger settlements because businesses want to avoid trial.68

Even prior to Epic, Professor Jean Sterlight had written,
“[t]oday employers, with substantial assistance from the
Supreme Court, are using mandatory arbitration clauses to
‘disarm’ employees, effectively preventing them from bringing
most individual or class claims and thereby obtaining access to
justice.”69
66. Id. at 936 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 944 (Graham, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
68. Campbel & Chang, supra note 1.
69. Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using
Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV.
1309, 1310 (2015) (footnote omitted).
Professor Cynthia Estlund raises an
interesting point, however:
Judith Resnik and others have shown that the
presumed contrast to litigation was in some
ways overstated as litigation itself has
dramatically receded from the public stage.
Public trials in civil cases have become nearly
extinct, as the overwhelming majority of cases
are resolved either on dispositive motions
(usually in unpublished opinions) or out-ofcourt settlements. Settlements between

SIGN OR ELSE.

2019]

275

Yet the Eleventh Circuit decisions make one wonder: will
businesses complaining of runaway juries someday have
occasion to complain of runaway arbitrators?70

private parties often include non-disclosure
provisions barring parties from discussing
anything about the case or its resolution.
Estlund, supra note 9, at 679-80. She states: “While it is important not to overstate
the contrast between arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of
the arbitral process is shielded from public view.” Id. at 680.
70. In one piece, a law firm warns of
the “runaway arbitrator,” guided only by a
sense of fairness, who makes a massive award
against the party he or she believes is in the
wrong. Unlike a jury verdict, an excessive
arbitral award is nearly impossible to
overturn on appeal. Because of its
unpredictable and unreviewable nature,
arbitration may sometimes be a more risky
choice than litigation.
Mike Gaddis et al., Arbitration Risks: Why Arbitration is Not Necessarily Better,
Faster,
or
Cheaper
Than
Litigation,
LEXOLOGY
(Nov.
30,
2016),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d09fdf94-5789-47bf-b728c6316a7c35da. This article notes that “[a]rbitrated cases are rarely resolved by
dispositive motions, and are less likely to reach early settlement than litigated
cases. In contrast to many judges, who want to clear their busy dockets as quickly as
possible, arbitrators are often paid by the hour.” Id. Though, as Professor Sternlight
maintains, “Even assuming for the sake of argument that employees did quite well in
arbitration (which is not the case), mandatory arbitration would still be quite
harmful if it prevented large numbers of employees from filing claims at all.”
Sternlight, supra note 69, at 1322. As Professor Estlund states:
It now appears that the great bulk of disputes
that are subject to mandatory arbitration
agreements (“MAAs”)—that is, a large share
of all legal disputes between individuals
(consumers
and
employees)
and
corporations—simply evaporate before they
are even filed. It is one thing to know that
mandatory arbitration draws a thick veil of
secrecy over cases that are subject to that
process. It is quite another to find that almost
nothing lies behind that veil. Mandatory
arbitration is less of an “alternative dispute
resolution” mechanism than it is a magician’s
disappearing trick or a mirage.
Estlund, supra note 9, at 682.
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V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Congress should enact legislation to exclude
employment law violations from mandatory arbitration,
although, despite the topical primacy of the #MeToo movement,
this exclusion should not be confined to sexual harassment
claims alone.71 As noted earlier, there would seem to be no policy
reason to distinguish the insidiousness of sexual harassment
from racial discrimination or wage theft. Indeed, one can easily
imagine the existence of all three claims for a single claimant.
Although states are limited in directly taking on Epic due to the
FAA’s preemption clause, an approach taken in the state of
Washington would seem to pass muster, and could be replicated
elsewhere.
Under this Washington law, enacted in 2018 and
characterized as “encouraging the disclosure and discussion of
sexual harassment and sexual assault in the workplace”:
[A]n employer may not require an employee, as a condition of
employment, to sign a nondisclosure agreement, waiver, or other
document that prevents the employee from disclosing sexual
harassment or sexual assault occurring in the workplace, at workrelated events coordinated by or through the employer, or between
employees, or between an employer and an employee, off the
employment premises.72

Note that this does not purport to speak to procedural
rights, such as the ability to use arbitration agreements.
71. This would not be a cure-all. One commentator notes that even if:
companies stop using forced arbitration, their
workers will still have plenty of reasons not to
speak up: fear of retaliation (even though it’s
illegal), fear of being blacklisted, difficulty
finding a lawyer to take the case. And with
President Trump remaking the judiciary in
his image, federal court may soon not be such
a great option, either. But at the very least,
working people should have the chance to
have their day, together, in court.
Terri Gerstein, End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment. Then Do More., N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/opinion/arbitrationgoogle-facebook-employment.html.
72. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 117 §1(1) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in California in 2018, “outgoing Gov. Jerry Brown
signed into law a bill that would ban nondisclosure provisions in
settlements involving claims of sexual assault, harassment or
discrimination based on sex.”73 The Supreme Court would be
hard-pressed to claim that the FAA can preempt even the
disclosure of sexual harassment or assault – disclosure that
authorities can then act upon, as they are not parties to the
contract.74 To this approach I would add other employment law
violations.

73. Stacy Perman, #MeToo law restricts use of nondisclosure agreements in sexual
misconduct
cases,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
31,
2018),
https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231story.html. Maryland’s Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018,
in a component that does not purport to ban arbitration, also requires that employers
of 50 or more employees report to the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights sexual
harassment settlements (on its own terms this does not apply to either arbitral
awards or arbitrations that do not result in award). See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. § 3-715(2)(a)(3) (West 2018).
74. Surely the conservative justices must subscribe to the words of the Good Book:
“And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” John 8:32 (King
James). Two of the justices – Kavanaugh and Clarence Thomas –have faced serious
allegations of sexual misconduct, with those involving Thomas featuring a past work
subordinate. See, e.g., Ron Elving, Anita Hill’s Challenge To Clarence Thomas: A
Tale
Of
2
Lives
And
3
Elections,
NPR
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/20/649721806/anita-hills-challenge-to-clarence-thomasa-tale-of-2-lives-and-3-elections.
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